This is probably not your typical Christmas/ New Year Day reading, it’s not mine either. But in the last week, I have been reading the new 43 paged report Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis published by the International Crisis Group (ICG). I think that the report is a very welcome addition to our conversation on citizenship and belonging in Nigeria and it raises issues we ought to spend a little more time considering even if it is Christmas time/ New Year. This report is closely related to my last column on citizenship and indigeneity in Nigeria. So I have decided this week to read the ICG report and raise a few thinking/talking/action points for consideration among Nigerians and all those concerned with issues of membership in political communities.
Overall, I think that the ICG report is comprehensive and well thought out. For example, with the ICG beginning a series on Curbing Violence in Nigeria with a publication on Jos, they are in effect indicating that Jos is at first really only a subset of the wider conflict risk in Nigeria and secondly, Jos ought to be treated as the starting point of conflict resolution in Nigeria in general. Importantly, the report offers recommendations for the Federal and Plateau State governments as well as to development partners. The executive summary presents a summarized proposed plan of action for the stakeholders (although some recommendations seem disconnected from the logic of the main report).
But for me, a closer look at the recommendations in the report slightly dampened the optimism with which I had downloaded and read the report. First, the report is addressed only to formal actors – the State and its agents as well as bilateral donors. Obviously, there is need to consider the role of (and speak to) youths and youth organisations, community leaders, religious organizations and the civil society as potentially active speakers in the Jos conversation. Then some sections of the report seem contradictory to me; for example, how could the critique directed at traditional and cultural institutions for complicity in the Jos conflict be reconciled with the call for more traditional institutions? Or, how a truth and reconciliation commission could combine with the prosecution of offenders from the crises?
ICG draws attention to the ambiguous discussion of indigeneity in the Nigerian constitution. For example, section 147:3 states that “the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State” this is based on the Federal Character principle in Section 14:3 and 4 and also in 25:1a where the constitution makes reference to “communities indigenous” to states of the federation. To resolve this dilemma of indigeneity, the ICG report calls for the swift passage of the Residency Bill (2004) but does not say what the bill proposes or contains. I thought the first step would be to locate the 2004 report, popularize the change that it proposes and inspire consensus around the issues rather than around the Zwingina sponsored 2004 bill (try to look up ‘Zwingina third term’ on Google to get a better perspective).
Some of us already know that documenting the different attacks in Jos has proven to be a very difficult task. First, even media reports are said to be partial to parties to the conflict and claims of casualties are often challenged and conflicting. But I was shocked to note that “Kuru Karama” was nowhere mentioned the ICG report. Instead, the Dogo Nahawa attack was reported to have occurred in January (instead of March) 2010. This little mix up is very significant if one considers that the concentric circles of reprisals attacks seem to be tied more to the Kuru Karama attack of January 2010. In another section, ICG claimed that Du is a sub-ethnic group of the Berom ethnic group – many of us think of Du to be a simple Berom village in Jos South LGA from where Governor Jang hails and not an ethnic group, not even a sub. We need to interrogate the proliferation of new ethnic groups even if they bear a ‘sub’ on their names.
If the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group is the most populous in Jos North as claimed by the ICG report, should that necessarily translate to electoral victories in free and fair elections? Subscribing to this tribal model of democracy is harmful for Jos and Nigeria. It risks reducing our democracy to a mere census of tribes and putting a stamp of authority on the domination of the minorities by the majority ethnic groups. Linking electoral success to the concentration of ethnic group is the sort of tribal card one finds in some political speeches and not to be expected in an ICG report.
ICG draws attention to the Sokoto State model of resolving the question of indigeneity and belonging (which I am researching into) as the way out for Plateau State. But is it true that I could contest an election in Sokoto come 2015? If it is true that all who live in Sokoto feel and are accepted as indigenous, then it is indeed laudable progress that all other states should aim to. But I disagree with the ICG that Plateau State government “should not wait for national constitutional reform before abolishing discriminatory policies on education and employment between indigenes and settlers”. It may be true that Sokoto dismantled its indigene-settler regime without constitutional reform [does that not make it in fact unconstitutional?], but that should be an inspiration to change the laws and not to disregard them altogether.
ICG draws attention to the Sokoto State model of resolving the question of indigeneity and belonging (which I am researching into) as the way out for Plateau State. But is it true that I could contest an election in Sokoto come 2015? If it is true that all who live in Sokoto feel and are accepted as indigenous, then it is indeed laudable progress that all other states should aim to. But I disagree with the ICG that Plateau State government “should not wait for national constitutional reform before abolishing discriminatory policies on education and employment between indigenes and settlers”. It may be true that Sokoto dismantled its indigene-settler regime without constitutional reform [does that not make it in fact unconstitutional?], but that should be an inspiration to change the laws and not to disregard them altogether.
I think that the question of belonging and citizenship in Nigeria and all parts thereof is too important to resolve by administrative fiat alone. Obviously we have to consider, by what right should we make demands on Plateau that we could not make (or are declining to make) on all the States and indeed on the Constitution of Nigeria. Why should discrimination be abolished in Plateau State but upheld in Rivers State (for example)? If, on the other hand, all states consent to abolish discrimination between indigenes and settlers then why should that not be upheld in national law before being implemented?
I think Operation Rainbow (OR) – the new civil-military security force in Plateau State ought to have been received with more cautious optimism than the ICG has shown in its report. There is need to still consider some of the critique one find against this new force. First, the legal basis of the Operation remains unclear (recall the critique against the Bakassi Boys for example). Also the relationship and information sharing between OR and other constituted law enforcement agencies need to be evaluated more closely and the OR defined as either a temporary or a permanent unit.
Then there is the question of the “volunteers” of the OR being drawn from all the electoral wards of Plateau State. If the neutrality of the security forces on the Special Task Force (STF) in Plateau State could not be guaranteed, then who is to say that youths drawn from the same troubled communities (some of whom might conceivably be survivors [perpetrators?] of earlier phases of the conflict) would suddenly become neutral officers of law? On the other hand, indigeneity is an issue in the conflict in Jos. If it is true that some persons have over the years been denied indigeneship certificates, then it would follow that such persons could not be recruited to serve in the OR or benefit from its social welfare schemes. And that would have an impact on the Jos situation.
I think that some of the recommendations of the ICG report require more concerted debate. For example, observers cite the creation of Jos North LGA as a main factor in the Jos conflict, yet the report call for the fragmentation of the same disputed local council into more LGAs. In other words, that the conflict be decentralized so that the Beroms and the Hausa-Fulanis could fight over multiple and not just one LGA. This contrast some proposals such as the suggestion to scrap the contentious Jos North LGA (which presents different sort of problems too).
It seems clear already that the Jos conflict could not be explained or resolved by a single report. What we need to do is to sustain this debate on who we are as Nigerians and also who we are not. From the Jos conflict so much has been written by experts, judicial commissions, the media, government and community leaders. So we have a lot being said; but we need to develop our system of listening so we don’t talk past each other. Since the ICG report is only the first in the series discussing curbing violence in Nigeria, we eagerly await the other reports in the series with the hope that they speak to a listening nation.
